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Abstract
During the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in No-
vember 2012, and the 12th National People's Congress in March 2013, the 
Chinese leadership in Party organs and the state apparatus underwent a 
signiﬁcant reshufﬂe. During this leadership change, virtually all leaders of 
the central organs were reappointed. While the actual structural and po-
litical reforms the new leadership is willing—and able—to make remain 
to be seen, an initial review of the top leadership in Party and state organs, 
including the ministries and provincial governments, reveals a relatively 
conservative team leading China in the coming ﬁve years. This article at-
tempts to give a comprehensive review of the leadership changes, along with 
an initial analysis of the announced structural changes and the implications 
these changes could have for China's political recalibration and development. 
Keywords: Chinese Communist Party, 18th Party Congress, 12th National People's 
Congress reform, leadership change
At the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, China initiated a leader-
ship transition, which has now been completed with the election of a new 
government and a comprehensive reshufﬂing of provincial governors 
and Party secretaries. The result of last year's leadership transition in 
the Party was met with widespread disappointment as the new Stand-
ing Committee was composed of a majority of older and relatively 
conservative former provincial leaders, whereas younger and more 
reform-oriented candidates were passed over. The factional balance of 
the new Standing Committee was also heavily skewed towards former 
secretary general Jiang Zemin's faction. It is also difﬁcult to claim that 
a generational change has taken place as the average age of the new 
top leadership is 63.4 years. The only two members below the age of 
60 are the new secretary general, Xi Jinping, and the designated prime 
minister, Li Keqiang (Miller 2013; Brødsgaard 2012a; Li 2013; China 
Directory 2013).
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At the recent session of the National People's Congress (NPC), China 
completed its leadership transition by appointing a new government. 
A closer look at the composition of the new state leadership gives rise 
to a more optimistic view concerning the possibility of reform and the 
implementation of new, necessary policies. Thus, some of the leaders 
who were passed over in November last year have been able to stage 
a comeback. The most prominent example is former head of the cen-
tral organizational department, Li Yuanchao, who did not make it to 
the Standing Committee at the 18th Party Congress, but managed to 
become vice president at the recent NPC meeting. Another example 
is the reform-oriented former provincial leader in Guangdong, Wang 
Yang, who also did not make it to the Standing Committee, but who 
was appointed vice premier at the NPC session, and therefore is in a 
good position to be promoted to the Standing Committee at the next 
Party congress in 2017.
Personnel Changes at the Helm
As expected, Secretary General Xi Jinping was elected president and Li 
Keqiang was elected prime minister. The new prime minister nominated 
a list of candidates for members of the State Council as vice premiers, 
state councilors and cabinet ministers. Vice premiers are ranked higher 
than state councilors, who are in turn ranked higher than cabinet 
ministers. The new vice premiers are Standing Committee member 
Zhang Gaoli, former state councilor Liu Yandong, former Guangdong 
provincial secretary Wang Yang, and former State Council secretary 
general and state councilor Ma Kai. The new state councilors are the 
new State Council secretary general Yang Jing, defence minister Chang 
Wanquan, former foreign minister Yang Jiechi,  minister for public se-
curity Guo Shengkun, and former head of the State Assets Supervisory 
and Administration Commission (SASAC) Wang Yong. Liu Yandong 
is the only woman among these top state ofﬁcials. The inner cabinet 
is joined by an additional 23 ministers—nine of whom are newly ap-
pointed. Among these, it is noteworthy that the former minister of land 
and resources, Xu Shaoshi, has been appointed head of the powerful 
National Development and Reform Commission, which is in charge 
of overall economic planning in China. It is also interesting that the 
former head of the China Investment Corporation (CIC), Lou Jiwei, has 
taken over the position as minister of ﬁnance and the former director 
of the Taiwan Ofﬁce, Wang Yi, has been appointed foreign minister. 
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However, since the previous foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, has been 
promoted to state councilor, he will be in charge of foreign policy work 
in the State Council, and formally be ranked above Wang Yi. Including 
Liu Yandong, there are three female ministers. In the previous govern-
ment there were two ministers who were not members of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).  As the former minister of health Chen Zhu 
has resigned, the minister of science and technology, Wan Gang, is the 
only non-CCP member left.1
There are three members of the Standing Committee of the CCP who 
also hold top positions in the state apparatus. These are President Xi 
Jinping, Prime Minister Li Keqiang, and Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli. 
Politburo Standing Committee member Zhang Dejiang has been ap-
pointed chairman of the NPC and in this capacity is also involved in 
government work. It was rumoured that Standing Committee member 
Liu Yunshan, head of the Party secretariat and former minister of the 
powerful propaganda department, would become the new vice presi-
dent. He is president of the Central Party School and since 1998 the head 
of this elite training centre has also held the position as vice president. 
But this arrangement has now been abandoned in order to bring Li 
Yuanchao into a top state post.
At the provincial level, considerable reshufﬂing has also taken place 
(see Table 1). It is noteworthy that Hu Chunhua has been appointed 
Party secretary in Guangdong. This is yet another indication that he 
is in line to become one of the key members of the so-called sixth 
generation, which will take over in 2023 when Xi Jinping and the ﬁfth 
generation leave the scene. Another prominent member of the sixth 
generation is Sun Zhengcai, who has been appointed Party secretary 
of Chongqing. The only woman among China's provincial Party sec-
retaries and governors is Sun Chunlan, who has been appointed Party 
secretary in Tianjin.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are also part of the power system 
in China (Brødsgaard 2012b; Eaton 2013). The 115 SASAC companies 
enjoy vice-ministerial status and a few of them ministerial status.2 
This inclusion in the governance structure stems from the rank of 
their company leadership, the (Party) secretary, which in most cases 
also holds the post of the director (with the position of the secretary 
outranking the director in terms of power). The secretaries are ap-
pointed by Party organs; in the case of 53 of the central SOEs by the 
central CCP Organization Department. Their leaders are often rotated 
to take up positions in other companies or assume leading state and 
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TABLE 1: New Positions in the State Apparatus
Position Name
CCP/PLA  
positions
Year 
Born
Central State
President Xi Jinping
Secretary General 
CCP; CMC
1953
Vice President Li Yuanchao CCP PB 1950
Premier Li Keqiang CCP SC 1955
Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli CCP SC 1946
Vice Premier Ma Kai CCP PB 1946
Vice Premier Liu Yandong (F) CCP PB 1945
Vice Premier Wang Yang CCP PB 1955
Secretary General SC Yang Jing CC 1953
State Councilor Chang Wanquan CC; CMC 1949
State Councilor Yang Jiechi CC 1950
State Councilor Guo Shengkun CC 1954
State Councilor Wang Yong CC 1955
Ministries
Foreign Affairs Wang Yi CC 1953
National Defense Chang Wanquan CC 1949
NDRC Xu Shaoshi CC 1951
Education Yuan Guiren CC 1950
Science and Technology Wan Gang CC 1952
State Security Geng Huichang CC 1951
Supervision Huang Shuxian CC 1954
Civil Affairs Li Liguo CC 1953
Justice Wu Aiying (F) CC 1951
Auditor General Liu Jiayi CC 1955
Finance Lou Jiwei CC; CIC secretary 1950
HR and Social Security Yin Weimin CC 1953
Land & Resources Jiang Daming CC 1953
Environmental Protection Zhou Shengxian CC 1949
Governor of PBC Zhou Xiaochuan 1948
Housing and Rural-Urban  
Development
Jiang Weixin CC 1949
Transport Yang Chuantang CC 1954
Water Resources Chen Lei CC 1954
Industry & Information Techno-
logy
Miao Wei CC 1955
Ethnic Affairs Comm. Wang Zhengwei CC 1957
Public Security Guo Shengkun CC 1954
Agriculture Han Changfu CC 1954
Commerce Gao Hucheng CC 1951
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TABLE 1: continued
Culture Cai Wu CC 1949
National Health and Family  
Planning Comm.
Lin Bin (F) CC 1954
SASAC Wang Yi CC 1953
Local Government Party Secretary Governor/Mayor
Beijing (Municipality) Guo Jinlong Wang Anshun 1947/57
Shanghai (Municipality) Han Zheng Yang Xiong 1954/53
Tianjin (Municipality) Sun Chunlan (F) Huang Xingguo 1950/54
Chongqing (Municipality) Sun Zhengcai Huang Qifan 1963/52
Guangdong Province Hu Chunhua Zhu Xiaodan 1963/53
Fujian You Quan Su Shulin 1954/62
Zhejiang Xia Baolong Li Qiang 1952/59
Jiangsu Luo Zhijun Li Xueyong 1951/50
Shandong Jiang Yikang Guo Shuqing 1953/56
Henan Guo Gengmao Xie Fuzhan 1950/54
Hebei Zhou Benshun Zhang Qingwei 1953/61
Liaoning Wang Min Chen Zhenggao 1950/52
Jilin Wang Ruilin
Bayanqolu/Bayin-
chaolu
1953/55
Heilongjiang Wang Xiankui Lu Hao 1952/67
Inner Mongolia AR Wang Jun Bagatur/Bate'er 1952/55
Shanxi Yan Chunqing Li Xiaopeng 1952/59
Shaanxi Zhao Zhengyong Lou Qinjian 1951/56
Sichuan Wang Dongming Wei Hong 1956/54
Hubei Li Hongzhong Wang Guosheng 1956/56
Hunan Xu Shousheng Xu Shousheng 1953
Jiangxi Qiang Wei Lu Xinshe 1948/56
Guangxi AR Peng Qinghua Ma Biao 1957/54
Yunnan Qin Guangrong Li Jiheng 1950/57
Qinghai Luo Huining Luo Huining 1953/54
Gansu Wang Sanyun Liu Weiping 1952/53
Tibet AR Chen Quanguo Losang Jamcan 1955/57
Xinjiang AR Zhang Chunxian Nur Bekri 1953/61
Ningxia AR Li Jianhua Wang Zhengwei 1950/57
Anhui Zhang Baoshun Wang Xuejun 1950/52
Notes: PLA = People's Liberation Army; CCP = Chinese Communist Party; CIC = China Invest-
ment Corporation; PBC = People's Bank of China; SASAC = State-Owned Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission; CC = Central Committee; CMC = Central Military Commission; PB 
= Politburo; SC = Politburo Standing Committee
Sources: www.gov.cn; www.baidu.cn; www.chinavitae.com.
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Party positions. Examples include former prime minister Li Peng's son, 
Li Xiaopeng, who in 2008 was transferred from his position as CEO of 
the big power company Huaneng to become executive vice governor 
in Shanxi. He was recently appointed governor of the province. An-
other example is Su Shulin, the former head of Sinopec, who in 2011 
was transferred to become governor of Fujian province (Brødsgaard 
2012b). The most recent move from big business to a state post is the 
transfer of the head of PetroChina, Jiang Jiemin, to become chairman 
of SASAC.3 This is a somewhat paradoxical appointment. SOE reform 
is a pressing issue in China, and in the process of reform, SASAC will 
play a key role. However, given his ties to the big oil companies, Jiang 
Jiemin will most likely be hesitant to spearhead initiatives that will 
limit the power of the SOEs.
The new leadership around Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang was expected 
to come up with a new political programme, refocus the political agenda 
and leadership style to address the many challenges China faces and 
deﬁne China's position in the international arena. Hopes were that these 
younger leaders would push political and structural reforms as well 
as the necessary economic rebalancing, and to end the 'lost decade' of 
reform-stop under their predecessors Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.4 As 
expected, they announced 'far-reaching' restructurings and reforms, and 
a 'streamlining of the government' in the form of structural changes at 
the ministerial level. In doing this, they followed the tradition of an-
nouncing some degree of reform, as all the new (ﬁrst session) NPCs 
since 1993 have done.5 However, the structural reforms announced 
during this NPC were relatively conservative in nature and extent (and 
with one exception), the large central institutions (such as the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)) have kept or even 
bolstered their power. 
Limited Structural Change
The largest change in this round of reforms is the dissolution of the 
Ministry of Railway (MOR).6 This had been expected for some time, 
especially after the Wenzhou train crash in July 2011 and the subse-
quent investigations that showed the enormous degree of corruption 
and abuse of authority in the ministry, leading to the arrest of its 
secretary (known as 'Mr 4%') and the chief engineer on charges of 
large-scale corruption. The ministry had long been seen as a bloated 
and inefﬁcient remnant from planned economy times, even having its 
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own police and court system, employing almost 2 million people and 
investing as much as US$ 120 billion in 2011.7 According to the reform 
plan, the ministry's policy planning and administrative functions will 
now be under the newly established State Railway Ofﬁce, which itself 
is supervised by the Ministry of Transport.8 The commercial activities 
will be managed by a new SOE, the China Rail Transfer Corporation, 
which will most likely be a SASAC company with vice-ministerial 
rank. This move will boost efﬁciency and reduce embezzlement, but 
not change the monopoly of state-owned entities over the rail sector. 
However, this dissolution of a large and powerful ministry is also seen 
as a statement, to show that the leadership is willing and capable of 
acting against even strong vested interests at the ministerial level, if 
corruption and abuse of power are endangering regime legitimacy 
and socio-political stability. 
The second reform will see the merger of the Ministry of Health and 
the National Population and Family Planning Commission, to form 
the new National Health and Family Planning Commission. This new 
commission will assume all functions except the macro and policy plan-
ning of a population strategy, which now lies within the NDRC.  This 
restructuring suggests that rumours about a loosening of population 
control (the one-child policy) might be true, which makes sense in light 
of an ageing population.9 It will likely limit the authority of the popu-
lation control bureaucracy (one of the most integrated ones, reaching 
down to every level of society), while boosting the leverage of the health 
sector administration. 
The third reform is the merger of the State Food and Drug Admin-
istration and the State Commission on Food Safety, to form the new 
State Food and Drug Supervision Administration. Additionally, some 
speciﬁc authorities over food production and food sales are being ab-
sorbed from other ministries, to create a more comprehensive and uni-
ﬁed administration, especially in the food sector. This clearly shows the 
leadership's awareness of the large problems the food and drug sectors 
face, struggling with huge quality and safety issues (Xue and Zhang 
2013). While announced as a primary goal, it is unclear if and how this 
new organ will actually cut red tape and improve quality supervision, 
especially at local levels.
Fourth, the Administration of Press and Publication (APP) merges 
with the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT). 
They will form the new State Administration of News, Broadcasting, 
Film and Television. This reform falls short of the hopes that both 
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organs would be absorbed by the Ministry of Culture, rather than 
forming another large entity regulating the media sector. Together 
with the CCP propaganda department, the media sector now has three 
large, powerful organs in charge of supervision, administration and 
production. This relatively conservative outcome could be the result of 
the relatively weak Ministry of Culture, and the strong role of censor-
ship and media control by the Party's propaganda department nested 
in SARFT and APP.
The ﬁfth restructuring is seen as a logical step toward more compre-
hensive administration of maritime issues, with the creation of the State 
Oceanic Administration, which absorbs the China Marine Surveillance 
along with partial authorities from other ministries. These are authority 
over ﬁshery policy formerly under the Ministry of Agriculture, the Anti-
smuggling Ofﬁce in the Customs Administration, and border patrols 
formerly under the Ministry of Public Security. Given the increasing 
attention on maritime issues, and China's strong and pronounced inter-
ests in the Yellow and South China Seas, this seems like a good move 
to target the fragmentation of maritime issues. Together with the Navy 
and the Maritime Security Small Leading Group headed by Xi Jinping, 
the new State Oceanic Administration will be an inﬂuential player in 
maritime issues, not least the Diaoyu/Senkaku conﬂict. 
Restructuring number six is the shift of the functions of the regula-
tory body of electricity, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(SERC), formerly a bureau-rank organ under the NDRC, which will 
be absorbed by the National Energy Administration (NEA). Although 
the NEA is also supervised by the NDRC, it has increased its leverage 
somewhat by incorporating the SERC, as well as through its new direc-
tor, Wu Xinxiong, who holds full minister rank instead of vice-minister 
rank as the NEA's former director Liu Tienan did.10 This, however, falls 
short of the hopes and rumours of a planned 'energy super-ministry',11 
that could assume comprehensive and strategic authority over energy 
planning, policy making and supervision. The energy sector remains 
one of the most valuable industries, and the energy SOEs as well as the 
NDRC are not interested in giving away their leverage over it, which 
would be required if a new energy ministry were to be established. In 
fact, the central energy SOEs have defended their monopolies, and the 
NDRC (together with the NEA) remain the most powerful authorities 
in energy planning and policy making (Downs 2008). The NDRC has 
also been able to get ﬁve full minister-rank ofﬁcials in its leadership 
team, two more than before. 
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Implications of the Restructurings
The restructuring measures outlined above have largely fallen short of 
the expectations many had for the new leadership, both in China and 
abroad. Except for the dismantling of the MOR, they constitute rather 
small changes, and their ability to reduce red tape and increase super-
vision effectiveness remains to be seen. It seems that powerful actors, 
especially in energy, natural resources, construction and the SOEs, 
have blocked deeper structural reforms that could have addressed in-
efﬁciency in state-owned industries and monopolies, thereby blocking 
any signiﬁcant change in the supervision and administration of the most 
proﬁtable sectors occupied by SOEs and the powerful central planning 
commissions. The downsizing from 27 to 25 ministry-level organs at 
the central level, again with the exception of the MOR, in fact has not 
created less powerful but rather more powerful central organs, and the 
effect on increasing efﬁciency and reducing bureaucracy is unclear. The 
NDRC, SOEs and other often-criticized planning institutions such as the 
Ministry of Land and Resources have remained untouched. 
Similarly, there has been no signiﬁcant political reform; in fact the CCP 
has bolstered its position in the driver's seat. Although, for example, the 
public security apparatus has no leader at the Standing Committee level 
as it had with Zhou Yongkang before, the domestic security apparatus 
remains better funded than the People's Liberation Army. This shows the 
continued preference of hard measures to ensure stability and control the 
populace, and to curb unrest and social protest movements. The Party 
has without doubt shown that it acknowledges the challenges of cor-
ruption, weak supervision, red tape and increasing inequality,12 but it is 
not ready to delegate authority to non-party organs or even civil society. 
Another explanation is the strong role of vested interests, which use the 
integration of political and commercial authorities to create and enlarge 
their wealth, while blocking change for a more transparent and better 
supervised arrangement that potentially could impede their ability to 
accumulate wealth. However, it must be noted that the ﬁrst term of the 
NPC (ﬁve years) in China usually is the weaker one for the leadership, 
which ﬁrst has to create its own alliances and establish a power base 
throughout the system. So, there might be more reforms after the 19th 
Party congress in 2017, where ﬁve new ofﬁcials will enter the Standing 
Committee due to the mandatory retirement age: Zhang Dejiang, Yu 
Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli. As discussed 
above, a number of the new leaders likely to enter the Politburo and 
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Standing Committee in 2017 are more reform oriented than the relatively 
conservative, stability-focused line-up today. All in all, restructurings 
and reforms have only been pushed through in some political focus 
areas of the Xi-Li administration, such as maritime issues, and in the 
most pressing social hot-button sectors, such as food security and the 
weak health sector. Industrial powerhouses and 'super ministries' at 
the central level have remained in the driver's seat, and the marriage 
of political and commercial power seems unchallenged.
Political Programmes and Focus
Xi Jinping has been surprisingly quick in coining his own political pro-
gramme with the 'China Dream' and the 'rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation', which include the main goals of 'prosperity and happiness' and 
'revitalization' (at times translated 'rejuvenation') of the Chinese people.13 
While it is CCP Secretary General Xi's job to create China's overarching 
programmatic course, Premier Li also has set his own goals by stating 
that he will make urbanization his priority area, including the goal to 
move 400 million people to cities and towns within the next decade.14 It 
is hoped that this urbanization will become a catch-all cure for some of 
China's most pressing issues. It is seen as a key to economic rebalanc-
ing toward more consumption-led growth, but also aims to keep some 
drive in investment projects while increasing social equity and lifting 
living standards of the population. While these slogans and goals seem 
quite similar to those of the Hu-Wen leadership, there are, however, 
some differences. 
The 'China Dream' was already introduced as a programmatic slogan 
during the CCP congress in October last year and has been well-ac-
cepted by both ofﬁcial and popular media, responding to the increasing 
nationalistic and economic aspirations of the Chinese. There has also 
been criticism, and some refer to it as the 'China Dreams', in plural, sug-
gesting that ordinary people have different dreams than the rich and 
powerful. However, the slogan has proven to be ﬂexible and inclusive 
enough to become a political programme, while also including several 
key elements that are part of the 'rejuvenation of the Chinese nation'. 
This latter campaign has historic antecedents and pays respect to the 
former leaders' programmes, as well as the growing conﬁdence and 
pride of the Chinese people. The important roles of 'happiness' and 
'prosperity' in the programme can be understood as references to both 
Deng Xiaoping's 'well-off society' and the aim of sustaining economic 
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growth, as well as addressing concerns of inequality. 'Happiness' con-
tinues Hu Jintao's 'harmonious society' notion, but also addresses the 
continued and increasing need for infrastructure, social services and 
issues of declining social satisfaction. The 'rejuvenation' is a strong ref-
erence to the 'century of humiliation' that started with the opium wars 
and lasted until the founding of the People's Republic of China, but 
for many in fact only ended with the economic growth of recent times. 
Growing nationalism and pride among the general population back this 
programme, and it has been a smart move to gather popular consent 
around the leadership by presenting it as both distinctively Chinese and 
popular rather than elitist. The People's Daily quotes Xi as saying that 
'personal fate is intimately linked to the destiny of the nation',15 play-
ing to the responsibilities of cadres, but also the nationalistic pride of 
the people. The recent state-sanctioned criticisms of Apple seem to be 
a clear manifestation of this programme, a new-found conﬁdence, and 
not the programmatic 'biding our time and hiding one's strengths' from 
before. This is a bold move to create a new identity for the leadership, 
showing that China sees its rise as an international superpower, while 
domestically betting on nationalistic feelings and pointing away from 
legitimacy issues of the CCP. It is also a ﬂexible political programme for 
cadres to develop their own tool box in the localities, to shift from the 
strongly stability- and control-focused policies of the Hu-Wen admin-
istration, toward a more outcome-oriented policy regime, as opposed to 
a purely output-oriented one.
 At the same time, it shows a China that will test its limits more than 
before, while not addressing its own domestic ills, beyond the realm of 
political propaganda. The strong position of central planning commis-
sions, SOEs and the CCP's continued supremacy over the legal sector 
remain unbroken. The increased headwind that foreign companies face 
in China, exempliﬁed by the recent Apple case,16 will most likely not 
cease any time soon. China is growing more conﬁdent toward the out-
side, while the internal power structures and social fault lines remain 
in place.
Conclusion
The Party Congress and the recent NPC have marked a signiﬁcant 
turnover of cadres at the top levels of both the CCP and the state ap-
paratus. With a majority of top-level Party and state ofﬁces under new 
leadership, the recent Party congress and NPC must certainly be re-
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garded as an important shift in the political setup in China. While the 
Politburo is staffed with relatively old and conservative cadres, in the 
combined leadership of party and state, the factions remain fairly bal-
anced, although people associated with Jiang Zemin have maintained 
their inﬂuence. Many observers point to the many serious challenges to 
Party legitimacy, and to social and economic problems that have kept 
the government busy over the last few years, such as signiﬁcant cases 
of corruption (the Bo Xilai affair), growing inequality and the increas-
ing distrust of the population toward the leadership. The new team is 
seen as an experienced and inﬂuential 'maintenance crew', which will 
be able to ﬁx the worst problems and sustain a certain degree of growth 
and social stability. The many relatively young and reform-oriented 
ofﬁcials in the second and third row, waiting for their turn in 2017 and 
2022, certainly boost expectations for more substantial reforms, and 
especially political reform, after the next leadership transition beginning 
at the 19th Party congress in 2017. 
The reforms at hand are certainly not enough to address some of the 
most pressing issues for the economy, and the state-owned sectors are 
still in a preferential position against private, and especially foreign 
companies. Nevertheless, China's economy is growing steadily and there 
are no indications that this will change in the next few years. The next 
leadership transition in ﬁve years might bring about more substantial 
reforms if China manages to overcome the rising tensions related to 
social issues, the challenges of economic rebalancing, and given that no 
unpredictable, serious, destabilizing events occur, such as war, internal 
turmoil or a new bird ﬂu epidemic. A total transition to democracy or 
a free market economy seems unrealistic and naive in this light, and 
the world is probably best served with seeing China as the nation sees 
itself: an increasingly conﬁdent actor that, although facing huge domestic 
challenges, has a strong party-state eager to establish itself as one of the 
main powers in the international community.
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